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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintifflAppellee, 
v . 
EDWARD SMITH, 
Defendant\Appellant 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a conviction of one count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony 
in violation of U.C.A. §76-3-302 (1953, As Amended). The Appellant was convicted of the above 
charge after a jury trial, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor presiding. The appellant was tried in the 
Second District Court of Weber County on the 5th and 6th days of September, 1996. 
On October 11, 1996, the Defendant was sentenced to serve one term of five years to life on 
the conviction of Aggravated Robbery. The court also enhanced the Defendant's sentence for a term 
of zero to five years, to be served consecutively, pursuant to U.C.A. §76-6-203. The Appellant 
appeals the enhanced sentence imposed pursuant to U.C.A. §76-6-203 for use of a Dangerous 
weapon. 
* BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* Case No. 970181-CA 
* Priority No. 2 
1 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal was conferred upon the Supreme Court of Utah 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(I) 1953, as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court exercised its authority and poured the case over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW & CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
POINT I 
The Defendant's constitutional right to be free from Double Jeopardy was violated when the 
trial court imposed an enhanced sentence for using & "dangerous weapon" when using a dangerous 
weapon was already part of the offense for which the Appellant was convicted. 
Standard of Review 
Constitutional issues are a question of law. The trial court's determination of questions of 
law are given no deference and are reviewed by this court for correctness. State v. Thurman. 846 
P.2d 1256, 1271. 
Citation to the Record 
The Defendant properly objected to the imposition of the enhancement on the issue of Double 
Jeopardy. (T. Sentencing 14-31) 
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POINT II 
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it failed to allow a cautionary jury 
instruction requested by the Defendant regarding oral admissions. 
Standard of Review 
An appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction presents a question of law for 
which no particular deference is granted. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. V. 11th Avenue Corp.. 850 P.2d 
447, 452 (Utah 1993). An Appellate Court will review the trial court's instructions under a 
correction of error standard. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). Failure to give 
requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the jury 
to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law 
Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987). 
Citation to the Record 
The Defendant properly objected to the Court modifying the jury instruction. (T. Trial Vol. 
II, 85) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb: nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE L SECTION 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not toe-compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 76-3-203 
(Prior to 1995 Amendment) 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm 
or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less than one year nor 
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to 
run consecutively and not concurrently; 
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Secticrn 76-3-203 
(As amended effective May 1, 1995) 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier of fact finds a 
dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation of a dangerous weapon, as provided in Section 
76-1-601. was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less than one year nor 
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the 
representation of a dangerous weapon as provided in Section 76-1-60L was used in the commission 
or furtherance of a felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and.the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
Section 76-6-301 
(Robbery) 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means offeree or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit theft, commission of theft, or in th^ immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
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Section 76-6-302 
(Aggravated Robbery) 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felofiy. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing 
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was convicted of one count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. At 
trial, an investigating officer from the FBI testified that the Appellant admitted to the crime. At the 
close of evidence, the Appellant's trial attorney requested that the trial court give a cautionary jury 
instruction regarding oral admissions. The trial court struck the last sentence of the requested 
instruction before giving it to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the Appellant was 
sentenced to serve a term of five years to life on the charge of Aggravated Robbery. 
The trial court enhanced the Appellant's sentence pursuant to U.C. A. §76-3-203 (Amended 
1995). The enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon was a direct violation of the Appellant's 
right against double jeopardy. The Appellant was convicted of a first degree felony rather than a 
second degree felony, because of his use of a dangerous weapon. The court then enhanced his 
sentence for the use of the same dangerous weapon. This double punishment, for the use of a 
dangerous weapon, was a violation of the Appellant's right against double jeopardy. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 17, 1995 at approximately 11:45 p.m. two individuals entered the Wendy's restaurant 
through a back door. (T. Vol. I, pp. 14, 15, 40) One of the individuals was armed with a long rifle, 
and the other was armed with a pistol. (T. Vol. I, pp. 16, 21, 42, 47) At gunpoint, the employees 
were instructed to retrieve money from a safe and deliver it to the two suspects. The individuals then 
left the Wendy's. The Ogden City Police Department responded to the scene, and began an 
investigation into the robbery. (T. Vol. I, p 56) . 
On June 25, 1997 the Federal Bureau of Investigations (hereinafter "FBI") and some local law 
enforcement agencies were working a "storefront" operation in Davis County. (T. Vol. I, pp 61-62) 
The storefront operation had no connection to the Wendy's investigation. As a result of the 
storefront, FBI Agent Robert Evans met the Defendant. (T. Vol. I, p. 63) At trial, the FBI agent 
testified that the Appellant believed the agent to be a gangster. (T. Vol. I, p. 80) On June 25, 1995, 
while riding with Agent Evans from Layton to Salt Lake, the Defendant allegedly told Agent Evans 
that he and another individual by the name of Shane Searle committed a robbery of a Wendy's 
restaurant. (T. Vol. I, pp. 67-69) 
Agent Evans further testified that, after the Appellant's arrest on December 5, 1995, the 
Appellant again confessed to the robbery. (T. Vol. I, pp. 115-117) The admissions were not tape 
recorded, nor were they reduced to writing and signed by the Appellant. (T. Vol. I, pp 117-118) 
Prior to jury deliberations, the Appellant's attorney, Martin Gravis, requested that a 
cautionary jury instruction regarding oral admissions be given to the jury. The trial court allowed only 
an edited version of the instruction to be given to the jury. The edited version did not caution the jury 
regarding the unreliability of oral admissions. (J. Vol. II, p. 85) 
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Prior to the Appellant's trial and sentencing, the legislature amended the firearm enhancement 
statute, U.C.A. §76-3-203(1). The amendment ^changed the statute to allow an enhancement of a 
sentence if it was found that a "dangerous weapon" was used in the commission of a felony. The 
prior statute allowed for an enhanced sentence only if a "firearm" had been used in the commission 
of a felony. 
The Appellant was convicted of the Aggravated Robbery based upon his use of a "dangerous 
weapon" in the course of the robbery, and he was sentenced to serve a term of five years to life. The 
Appellant was also sentence to an enhanced term of zero to five years pursuant to U.C.A. §76-3-203 
for the use of the same "dangerous weapon". (T. Sentencing, p. 30) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error when it amended the proposed jury instruction 
submitted by the defense. Failure of the trial court to give the proposed instruction caused the jury 
to give undue weight to the oral admissions proffered by the officers. The cautionary instruction 
would have instructed the jury to use caution when considering an alleged oral admission. 
The Appellant's right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was subjected 
to an enhanced sentence under the dangerous weapon enhancement, U.C.A. §76-2-203. The 
Appellant was convicted of a first degree felony rather than a second degree felony, because of his 
use of a "dangerous weapon". The Appellant was further penalized for the same act when his 
sentence was enhanced for the use of the same "dangerous weapon". 
8 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE 
FREE FROM DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS VIOLATED WHEN 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPQSED AN ENHANCEMENT TO 
THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE FOR USING A 
"DANGEROUS WEAPON" \yHEN USING A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON WAS A ALREADY PART OF THE OFFENSE FOR 
WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution guarantee persons 
charged with a criminal offense the right to be free from double jeopardy. See U.S. Const. Amend. 
V; Utah Const. Art. L Section 12. The double jeopardy clause not only protects individuals against 
a second prosecution for the same offense, it also protects against a second punishment for the same 
offense. United States v. Bizzel. 921 F.2d 263 (10th cir. 1990); Grady v. Corbin. 495 U.S. 508, 110 
S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed 548 (1990). 
In the case at bar, the Defendant was subjected to a penalty enhancement pursuant to U.C.A. 
§76-3-203, due to his use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony. The Defendant's 
degree of offense was already enhanced from a second degree felony robbery, U.C.A. §76-3-301, to 
a first degree felony aggravated robbery, U.C.A. §76-3-302, based upon the use of the same 
dangerous weapon. This double punishment resulted in a violation of the Appellant's right against 
double jeopardy. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the double jeopardy clause is designed 
to "prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." 
Missouri v. Hunt 459 U.S. 359 (1983). Therefore, for the Court to properly analyze Appellant's 
claim of double jeopardy, it must determine what the legislative intent was when they enacted the two 
provisions. Albernaz v. United States. 450 U.S. 333 (1981). 
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In enacting U.C. A. §76-6-203 in 1976, the legislature made its intention very clear. The Utah 
Supreme Court as well as the Utah Court of Appeals have held that the previous statute did not 
violate the double jeopardy clause, because the legislature intended a more severe sentence based 
upon the specific type of weapon used. State v. Angus. 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978); State v. Speer. 
750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988); State v. Drawn. 791 p.2d 890, 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct. App. 
1990); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1990). In Angus, the Supreme 
Court examined the legislative intent behind the enhancement statute and found that: 
...the legislature has further determined that the use of some deadly weapons 
are more dangerous than others. For instance, a pocket knife, a baseball bat, 
or even a pencil, in some circumstances of use, may be a deadly weapon. But 
the legislature has regarded the use of firearms as innately more dangerous 
and therefore more deserving of punishment. For this reason it has provided, 
by Sec. 76-3-203 quoted above, that for conviction of any felony by using a 
firearm there shall be the additional penalty. (Emphasis added) 
It is clear that in enacting the original statute, the legislature intended the statute to apply only 
to those weapons that were inherently dangerous. Since the legislature intended to more severely 
punish those who used firearms, as opposed to other dangerous weapons, the statute was upheld. 
When the Legislature amended U.C. A. §76-6-302 to include all dangerous weapons in 1995, 
they did not make their intentions clear. The statute passed through the Senate without debate or 
question. (Recordings of Senate Debate, Day 45, February 29, 1995, 51st Legislative Session, Tape 
48, Count 2114) In the House of Representatives, the only comment made was that the legislature 
wanted to "broaden the ability of law enforcement to deal with violent crimes." (Recording of House 
of Representative Debate, Day 44, February 28, 1995, 51st Legislative Session, A.M. session, Tape 
1, Count 2309) These statements do not clearly represent that the legislature intended to provide dual 
punishment for those persons convicted of aggravated offenses, especially those who already had their 
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sentence enhanced pursuant to other statutes. Viewing the fact that aggravated offenses are increased 
a degree where there is use of a dangerous weapon, it seems unlikely that the legislature would again 
punish those felons for use of a dangerous weapon. Were that the legislative intent, it should be 
clearly reflected either in the statute or in the debates. 
The legislative history of the prior statute makes it clear that the intent was to severely punish 
those who used specific types of weapons. The Legislature felt that the use of a firearm justified 
additional penalties. However, in amending the statute to include all dangerous weapons, the 
legislature failed to make such a finding regarding dangerous weapons. 
During the 1995 legislative session, little or no discussion was presented to make the 
legislature's intention clear. Without clear evidencte to show that the legislature specifically intended 
to create a double punishment for person convicted of aggravated offense, the statute must be 
declared unconstitutional, because it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States 
Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
POINT H 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO ALLOW A CAUTIONARY JURY 
INSTRUCTION REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT 
REGARDING ORAL ADMISSIONS 
An appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction presents a question of law with no 
particular deference granted to the trial court's decision. Ong Int'l flJ.S.A.^ Inc. V. 11th Avenue 
Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). An Appellate Court will review the trial court's instructions 
under a correction of error standard. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). Failure 
to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead 
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the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on 
the law. Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Uth App. 1987). 
The trial court committed error when it failed to give a complete jury instruction requested 
by the Appellant. The Appellant requested the following instruction: 
You are the exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made an 
admission, and if so, whether such statement is true in whole or in part. If you 
should find that the defendant did not make the statement you must reject it. 
If you find that it is true in whole or in part, you may consider that part which 
you find to be true. 
Evidence of an oral statement of the defendant should be viewed with 
caution. (CALJIC 2.71, 1995) 
Instead of giving the instruction as requested, the trial court struck the last, and most crucial, 
sentence. 
The cautionary instruction requested by Appellant has been reviewed and found necessary 
when oral admissions are admitted in other jurisdictions. State v. Swee. 51 Or. App. 249, 624 P.2d 
1198 (1981); People v. Bemis. 33 Cal. 2d 395, 202 P.2d 82 (1949); People v. Pail. 22 Cal 2d 642, 
140 P.2d 828 (1943). 
However, this issue has only been superficially reviewed in Utah on two occasions. See State 
v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) and State v. Hymas. 131 P.2d 791 (Utah 1942). The Shabata 
court acknowledged that a cautionary instruction may have been appropriate in that case, but failed 
to find error because the Appellant failed to provide the proposed instruction. 
A "defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any 
basis in the evidence to support that theory." State v. Brown. 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980), and 
he is entitled to a cautionary instruction so long as it is not incorrect or misleadingly states the 
material rule of the law. State v. Aly. 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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The requested instruction was an accurate statement of the law, as the Court found in Hymas. 
In Hymas. the Court acknowledged and upheld the jury instruction charging the jury to "receive with 
great caution the written and oral statements attributed to defendant because of the dangers of 
misstatements, misunderstandings, the infirmities of memory, etc., and the possibility of the 
defendant's mind being oppressed and disturbed by his position." The Court in Hymas clearly found 
that the proposed instruction "embraces a correct legal principle". The legal principle has not been 
overturned or amended, and is still a correct statement of the law. 
The tendency of a witness to misstate the defendant's statements, or to misunderstand the 
defendant's statements and improperly convey them to the jury, require that a cautionary instruction 
should be given. Although the court does not have an obligation to provide an instruction without 
motion by a party, the trial court was required to give the instruction once it was proposed, so long 
as it did not misstate the law. The court's failure to advise the jury to use caution when evaluating 
the admission of the defendant prejudiced his case, and therefore requires reversal of the Defendant's 
conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant was denied his right to be free of double jeopardy when he was twice sentenced 
for the same oflfense. U.C. A. §76-3-203 should be found unconstitutional as it violates the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
The trial court's failure to give a jury instruction cautioning the jury regarding oral admissions 
was in error. Further, that error prejudiced the Appellant, and mandates, that the Appellant's 
conviction be reversed and remanded to the trial court to afford him a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <A-) day of May, 1997. 
Kent E. Snider 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing Brief to the following: 
Attorney General's Office 
ATTN: Criminal Appeals 
160 East 300 South, 6th floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
DATED this^ / day of May, 1997. 
^ .r .«^^,r j ^ 
-Kent E. Snider 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
(TRIAL VOLUME I) 
21 
A. Had bandanas around their face and a stocking 
cap, and that's pretty much just how he was dressed. 
Q. Okay. Could you tell what race that person was? 
A. I thought he was black when I saw him. 
Q. Okay. Once you — when he says, "get to the 
back," is there only one way to get to the back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Did you go there? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. And did you come in contact with another 
individual who was not an employee? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did that person have a gun? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What kind of gun was it? 
A. It was like a handgun. 
Q. All right. It was different than, in fact — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — the other one; is that right? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And what happened once you got back in the area 
where that person was? 
A. He told me to go to the office and kind of waved 
the gun towards that way. 
Q. Okay. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
40 
south side 
A. 
Q. 
you 
Yes. 
What — 
reason 
of the 
- what 
to bel 
building? 
happened or what was 
ieve that there was 
said 
an 
that gave 
armed robbery 
happening? 
A. They came — men came in with guns. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And told us to get to the back. 
Q. How many men? 
A. Two. 
Q. And when you say they came in, do you know how 
they came in? 
A. I believe it was through the west entrance, the 
rear door. 
Q. All right. Is that normally an employee entrance 
or a delivery entrance? 
A. Yeah. It was only opened to take out the 
garbage. The boys were taking out the garbage. 
Q. And do you recall approximately what time that 
would have happened when you first find out that 
there is an armed robbery, when these men had come 
into the area? 
A. Around — it was around 11:45. 
Q. Describe specifically as you can recall what you 
saw and what you heard once the men came in. What 
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did the person or persons say. Let's start with 
did — did one person come to the area where you were 
or did both of them? The two men that you didn't 
recognize or the two robbers. 
A. It was just one person that came forward up to 
the drive-through register. 
Q. All right. And what — what did that person 
appear to you like? Could you tell that it was a 
man? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And could you tell approximately how 
tall that person was? 
A. Yeah. I can't remember right now though. 
Q. All right. Did you give a statement shortly 
after this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And give estimates as to height, weight, and 
those kinds of thing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Could you tell what the — this 
particular man's race was? 
A. He was African-American. 
Q. Okay. Did that person have a gun or a firearm? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did that gun look like? 
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A. A rifle-type of gun, light brown in color. 
Q. And about how far away were you from that person 
when you could see that they had a rifle that was 
light brown in color? 
A. You mean when he first came in? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Probably about five feet. 
Q. Okay. 
A. At the most. 
Q. Okay. A little closer than perhaps you and I 
are? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. And was there anything that blocked 
or inhibited your ability to look at him as you're 
looking at me? Was there anything between the two of 
you? 
A. Un uh. 
Q. What did that person say when they came into that 
location with the gun in their hands? 
A. They told everything — he told everybody to get 
to the back, and kept on — he was using vulgar 
language. And so everybody started filing back, and 
he told me to come and open the cash register. 
Q. And what did you tell him or what did you do in 
response to him wanting you to come and open the cash 
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have a gun? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what kind of gun was that, if you know? 
A. A handgun. 
Q. Did you go back out to the area and attempt to 
get the cash register or the cash drawer for the 
first person you dealt with? 
A. No. 
Q. Did some other employee go out there? 
A. Yes. I went back and told them that they needed 
to send someone up to open up the registers, and 
Eric, the other manager that was working there, went 
and — 
Q. Then what did you do? 
A. I went back with the other employees and got down 
on the floor. 
Q. Okay. Facedown on the floor? 
A. No. Just crunched up in little balls. 
Q. Okay. Crunched up in a little ball? 
A. (Nods head up and down.) 
Q. And where was that happening? 
A. It was in the place where there is a sink and the 
manager's office. 
Q. All right. So that was near where the manager's 
office that Mandy would have been in; is that right? 
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Q. Do you recall whether or not — were you, in 
fact, working on the 16th of June? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And do you recall what shift you were on? 
A. Yes. I worked the graveyard shift. 
Q. What time does that start? 
A. At 9:00 p.m. 
Q. And ends? 
A. 7:00 a.m. 
Q. Did you, in fact, Officer Felter, receive a 
dispatch just prior to midnight on the 16th of June 
of 1995 of a robbery that just occurred at Wendy's on 
12th and Washington? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Is that within Ogden City jurisdictional limits? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Where were you at when the call came in? 
A. I was right close to 12th and Washington. 
Q. How long after the — receiving the dispatch were 
you able to -- how much time did it take before you 
arrived at Wendy's? 
A. Probably less than 30 seconds. 
Q. Were you alone when you arrived initially? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And did other police officers arrive after that? 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
61 
Force in Salt Lake City. 
Q. And how long have you been in that assignment? 
A. Since May of 1995. 
Q. What education do you have, please? 
A. I have a four-year undergraduate degree, a BA, 
and I also have a law degree. 
Q. When and where did you receive those? 
A. I received the undergraduate degree from 
Youngstown State University in Ohio, and the law 
degree from Case Western Reserve University in 
Cleveland, Ohio. 
Q. You indicate you've been with the FBI for 
approximately the past 10 years? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. When were you assigned in the Salt Lake office? 
A. In May of 1995. 
Q. Were you given a specific assignment shortly 
thereafter being assigned to Salt Lake in June of 
1995? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. What was that assignment? 
A. I was assigned to an undercover operation as an 
undercover agent. The operation was in effect in the 
Ogden and Layton area, targeting the Ogden O.V.G. 
street gang. 
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Q. And what — when you say an operation, what is it 
that you were trying to do or what was it you were 
doing? 
A. We were trying to make criminal cases against the 
various members of the O.V.G. street gang for their 
criminal acts that were being committed in the Ogden 
area. 
Q. And did — what is it that — was there something 
that was actually set up for this operation? 
A. Yes, there was. We had an undercover off-site in 
Layton, Utah, that the various gang members believed 
was a place of business where we would purchase 
drugs, guns, stolen property, acting in an undercover 
capacity. 
Q. All right. When you say "acting in an undercover 
capacity," you would portray yourself to be what? 
A. They believed I was a criminal, somebody who 
wanted to purchase drugs and stolen property. 
Q. All right. How long did that operation go on 
for? 
A. It went on until November of 1995. 
Q. Calling your attention specifically to June 25th 
of 1995, were you working in that undercover 
operation on that date? 
A. Yes, I was. 
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1 Q. Did you have occasion on the 25th of June of 1995 
2 to meet an individual who identified himself to you 
3 as Ed Smith? 
4 A. Yes, I did. 
5 Q. Do you see that person in court? 
6 A. Yes, I do. 
7 Q. Please, identify him. 
8 A. The defendant sitting at the defense table with 
9 the white shirt and maroon patterned tie. 
10 Q. All right. To the immediate right of Mr. Gravis, 
11 Mr. Gravis being in the dark blue jacket; is that 
12 right? 
13 A. That's correct. 
14 Q. Had you met him prior to June 25th of 1995? 
15 A . I had not. 
16 Q. How did he identify himself to you? 
17 A. I knew who he was or what he was supposed to look 
18 like, and he identified himself as Ed to me. 
19 Q. Where did you meet him? 
20 A . I met him at our undercover off-site in Layton. 
21 Q. And what was the reason that you were meeting 
22 with him this day? 
23 A. Mr. Smith believed that he was meeting with me to 
24 assist in a criminal act which he was going to make 
25 some money. The actual reason was to gain 
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A. This is. 
Q. Does it appear to be in the same condition today 
as it was when you purchased it? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. Did it have a clip in it when you purchased it? 
A. No, it did not. 
Q. So you did not purchase it with ammunition? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. Other than checking it and making 
sure it's unloaded, has it been changed or altered in 
any way? 
A. No, it has not. 
Q. And where has it been stored since being 
purchased in June of 1995? 
A. In a FBI evidence locker. 
Q. Thank you. That evidence locker is located 
where? 
A. In the FBI building in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Q. What did the defendant tell you — I believe your 
testimony was 
talking about 
that right? 
someth 
it was 
A. That's correct. 
ing -
that 
- his re sponse to your 
that job really sucked; 
Q. What — after that statement, 
defendant tell you, specie fically, 
what did 
about 
the 
the Wendy4 
is 
s 
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robbery that he had done? 
A. He told me that he and Shane Searle had, on a 
Friday night at about 11:45 p.m., went into the 
Wendy's; that he, the defendant, was carrying an SKS 
rifle; that Shane Searle was carrying a 
nine-millimeter handgun. That they went into the 
Wendy's; that the defendant shouted: Yo, this is a 
robbery, let's not make it a murder. That he ordered 
everybody to the back of the store; that he cleared 
the registers while Shane Searle held a 
nine-millimeter to the head of the girl who was made 
to open the safe and put the money into a bag. 
That during the robbery, one of the employees 
escaped and ran next door to a motel to try and use 
the telephone to call the police. And that they — 
when they exited, they found out later on that they 
did not get as much money as they should have. 
Q. Were you aware of any of those specific facts 
before the defendant told you about them? 
A. Other than that the Wendy's had been robbed, no, 
I was not. 
Q. How much money did he claim that he got? 
A. He told me he got about four or $500. 
Q. And did he indicate to you whether or not Mr. 
Searle's brother was involved in some way? 
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A. Yes. He told me 
Searle, was an employ 
provided them informa 
that Shane 
ee at the 
tion 
i Searle 
Wendy's 
necessary to 
fs brother, Ran 
and that he 
perform the 
robbery. 
Q. Okay. During the course of your traveling 
between Layton and Salt Lake City and having this 
conversation, did you have some type of recording or 
listening device activated and operating? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you have? 
A. I had a body recorder, we call it, because it's a 
recorder that we wear on our bodies, and it was 
secreted in my boot. 
Q. Did it record for the entire time that the two of 
you were together? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. And have you had an opportunity to take the tape 
recording that was made from that and listen to it? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Does it accurately record your conversations? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. What is the quality of that tape? 
A. Average to below average. It's not real clear, 
but you can hear the conversation. 
Q. Okay. In fact, when you say secreted in your 
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that you were present with Detective Minor on the 5th 
of December of 1995. Do you recall that? 
A, Yes, I do, 
Q. That you were present for the conversations 
between the defendant and Detective Minor. Do you 
recall that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. I did not specifically ask you what the defendant 
said at that point. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Gravis, in crossing Detective Minor, referred 
to the statement that was taken as an alleged 
conversation. Did a conversation take place between 
the defendant, Ed Smith, and Detective Minor? 
A. It certainly did, yes. 
Q. Did the defendant confess to Detective Minor? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Did you remain there for whatever the time period 
was of the conversation between the defendant and 
Detective Minor? 
A. Yes, I was there for the entire period. 
Q. Were there periods of time where in response to 
probing for specifics that the defendant would reply 
something? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. What would he reply? 
A. A lot of times he would just reply yes or yeah or 
affirmative-type responses, but without giving 
details. 
Q. Okay. Did he ever indicate, while you were 
there, that he couldn't remember things? 
A. Yeah. He said something about smoking a lot of 
marijuana and it affected his memory. 
Q. All right. In response to that, would you do 
something? In response to his saying --
A. Oh. 
Q. — I don't remember? 
A. Yeah. I was — I was trying to prod his memory. 
I was giving him details that he had told me. I 
said: Don't you remember telling me that, you know, 
this happened at Wendy's or that happened at Wendy's? 
Q. What would his responses be to that? 
A. He'd say, yes, and sort of just leave it at that. 
He wouldn't elaborate or give me any more details. 
Q. At any time while this defendant was talking to 
Detective Minor in your presence, or talking with 
you, did the defendant ever deny that he did the 
robbery at Wendy's? 
A. No, he hasn't. 
Q. With Shane Searle? 
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A. He never denied it. 
Q. Did he ever indicate to you or to Detective Minor 
that his prior conversation with you was puffing or 
bragging or anything like that? 
A. No, he never said anything to that effect. 
Q. Did he ever name anyone else as the person who 
had committed it? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Who? 
A. He said himself and Shane Searle, and that Ran 
Searle helped plan it. 
Q. All right. Other than that, did he name anyone 
else? 
A. No, he did not. 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you. That's all. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q. Was this alleged conversation recorded? 
A. No, it was not. 
Q. And why not, if you know? 
A. Our — the FBI policy is we never record any 
types of interviews or confessions of that type. 
Q. Why is that the policy of the FBI? 
A. I really couldn't tell you. It's just from day 
one we've been trained — 
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Q. So it boils down to if the defendant denies that 
a conversation occurred, it's your word against his? 
A. I don't think that's what it boils down to. We 
just tell what he said. 
Q. Okay. But there was no written statement taken 
from him? 
A. No, there was not. 
Q. And did you ask -- did you or Detective Minor ask 
him to give a written statement? 
A. No, we did not. 
Q. Okay. So -- but there was no recording, no 
writing, no nothing to verify this conversation took 
place, outside of your and Detective Minor's 
testimony? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HEWARD: 
Q. Except your word and Detective Minor's word? 
A. That's what it boils down to. 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
AGENT EVANS: Thank you, sir. 
MR. HEWARD: Could I just have a 
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Facts. Facts that support one and only one verdict, 
guilty as charged, aggravated robbery. 
THE COURT: Would you swear the 
bailiff, please? 
(WHEREUPON, the bailiff is sworn and 
acknowledges.) 
THE COURT: Okay, folks. 
(WHEREUPON, at this time the jury leaves the 
courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Do you want to make a 
record now on the objections to the jury 
instructions? 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go right ahead. 
MR. GRAVIS: I didn't go through the 
numbers with you, so I don't recall the numbers. A 
couple of them I do have. 
Well, I'll make a record of — of the one 
dealing with the defendant's admission or confession. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. GRAVIS: And I'd specifically 
requested that the last sentence that the Court 
struck: Evidence of an oral admission — or as I 
indicated in chambers — oral statement of the 
defendant should be viewed with caution. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Smith, 
me to proceed with sentencing on all of 
you understand that you'll have to give 
to delay on the Theft charge and on the 
Damaging Jail Property. You understand 
in order for 
the cases, 
up your right 
Escape and 
that you're 
entitled to have those matters stayed at least 48 
hours, and no longer than 45 days. Usually, that's 
for the purpose of getting a presentence report. But 
you understand, if you want me to proceed on 
sentencing on those today, you'll have to waive that 
time. 
MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that what you want to 
do? 
do. 
MR. SMITH: That's what I want to 
THE COURT: All right. You may 
proceed then, 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. As 
far as the multiple cases, they just address the 
aggravated robbery recommendation. There is a 
recommendation for five to life which, I guess since 
Mr. Smith is already in prison, I don't have a whole 
lot to say about that, except they're recommending it 
consecutive to the zero to five. 
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Mr. Smith, prior to this aggravated robbery, 
has, I believe, six or seven misdemeanor convictions, 
no prior felonies. The felony he's presently serving 
time on out of Davis County actually occurred after 
the robbery, but it was resolved prior to the robbery 
charge simply because, as the Court is well aware, 
Mr. Smith changed attorneys a few times and things 
like that that caused some problems and delayed this 
case in getting resolved first. 
So we'd submit that the — the recommendation 
that this five to life run consecutive to the zero to 
five he's already serving is inappropriate, just 
that — but for the way things happened, Mr. Smith 
would have been sentenced on this one first. I don't 
see any indication whether the Court down in Davis 
County had recommended there that they didn't want 
anything to run concurrent with their sentence. 
So, first off, we'd ask the Court not to 
sentence him consecutive to the zero to five he's 
already serving. 
More importantly, on the issue of the 
dangerous weapon enhancement, which we — we filed an 
objection to the dangerous weapon enhancement being 
imposed in this case and the State responded by way 
of memorandum. It's our position that the statute, 
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1 as amended in April of 1995, where the language was 
2 changed making it an enhancement for — changed it 
3 from firearm to a dangerous weapon in the enhancement 
4 statute, is it's simply a repetition of the 
5 aggravating factor which made this a first degree 
6 aggravated robbery from a robbery charge, and that is 
7 double jeopardy. 
8 Aggravated robbery, as defined in what Mr. 
9 Smith was convicted of, was he committed a robbery 
10 and used a dangerous weapon. So that's what he was 
11 convicted of is committing a robbery with a dangerous 
12 weapon, making it an Aggravated Robbery, First Degree 
13 Felony, rather than a second degree. And then to 
14 impose the further enhancement for Use of a Dangerous 
15 Weapon, I submit it's being punished twice for the 
16 same act, using a dangerous weapon in the commission 
17 of a robbery; and, therefore, it is our position that 
18 constitutes double jeopardy. 
19 Now, prior to the amendment, the Utah Supreme 
2 0 Court and the Court of Appeals had ruled that the 
21 firearm enhancement did not constitute double 
22 jeopardy, and in my memorandum I specifically cited 
2 3 some language from the State versus Webb case where 
24 they indicated that the legislature could find the 
25 use of a firearm, or facsimile, was a more ominous 
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threat than the use of any — a different — other 
type of dangerous weapons; and, therefore, that's why 
it was not double jeopardy because it was firearm as 
differentiated from other types of dangerous weapons. 
But the language changed in April of 1995 — 
that went into effect in April of 1995, they redid to 
both an aggravated robbery and the enhancement; 
therefore, it's being twice punished for the same --
same act, that's using a dangerous weapon in a 
robbery. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HEWARD: Your Honor, I'll 
address the issues in the -- essentially the same 
order as Mr. Gravis did. 
We do not have an objection to Mr. Smith being 
sentenced on the offenses that he's pled into today; 
however, there is restitution on each of those. I 
have an itemized listing of the restitution on the 
destruction of jail property that certainly Mr. 
Gravis and Mr. Smith can have a copy. It gives a 
breakdown, as well as the total. The total amount in 
order to repair and replace the items that he damaged 
is $1,169 even. That breaks out in both labor and 
materials at approximately $760 in labor and the 
remainder in materials. 
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On the issue on the stolen vehicle on Mr. 
Daines' case, I — I cannot give the Court an exact 
total. There are some forms that have been 
attached — that have been attached from Clarence and 
Kathy Jones, which were the owners of the 1991 Nissan 
Pathfinder. It appears that the vehicle that was 
stolen was insured through Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, and they have listed an itemized attachment 
for not only the vehicle, but all of the items that 
were — is this the stuff that was in it or the stuff 
that was taken in the burglary of the home? 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
MR. HEWARD: Maybe the best thing 
would be to do, Your Honor, in talking to Mr. Daines, 
who had that case, is just ask you to leave 
restitution open and we will attempt to -- rather 
than — with there not being a presentence report, if 
we could have about 3 0 or 4 5 days, we'll come up with 
a figure, submit that to Mr. Gravis, submit that to 
the Court, or you can leave it to the Board of 
Pardons, whichever you prefer. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, maybe we 
can -- Mr. Smith has indicated he wants a 
restitution hearing on — on the one matter. 
MR. HEWARD: On the jail matter? 
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MR. 
for the same time. 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
GRAVIS: 
HEWARD: 
DAINES: 
COURT: 
HEWARD: 
Your Honor, Mr. Gravis filed 
So we could set that 
That's fine. 
That's even better. 
Okay. 
Okay. On the issues, 
a brief and we 
responded, and I will assume that the Court had the 
benefit of our response and will not necessarily go 
back over each and every item. However, as we did 
line out for Your Honor, the specific issue that Mr. 
Gravis raises today has been previously raised, has 
been previously briefed from both sides, only when 
there is a little different language, when the 
language was firearm in the robbery or agg robbery 
statute, and firearm in the penalty enhancement 
section. While Mr. Gravis claims that this is 
different now by using — going to a dangerous 
weapon, he doesn't tell the Court how it's different, 
or how the analysis that the Court follows is any 
different. 
In the three cases that are cited, the Drawn 
decision, the Webb decision, and the Russell 
decision, these exact same arguments are raised and 
they are all handled in the exact same way. The 
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Court comes back and says: This is not double 
jeopardy. This is nothing other than a penalty 
enhancement. 
The legislature has determined that we are 
going to punish all felons who use a firearm 
in — in the three decisions. The only thing the 
legislature did when they changed that language is 
broadened the class. The analysis is no different. 
They simply looked at it, in my opinion, from the 
State's opinion, and simply said: We are not going 
to simply limit the penalty enhancement to just those 
who use firearms because someone who is threatened 
with a knife or who is threatened with another weapon 
is just in the similar or same position where they 
are being exposed to more danger, where people who go 
out and commit the crimes and who are armed with 
dangerous weapons are, in fact, creating a likelihood 
of a much more serious situation happening. 
Simply look at that and it's interesting, if 
you read the three decisions, pre-1975, the statute 
talked about dangerous weapons for purposes of the 
agg robbery. In '75, they changed to firearms, and 
then in '95, they went back to dangerous weapons. 
I'm not exactly sure why the legislature vacillates 
between one or the other. 
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1 But the bottom line is this is not a situation 
2 where Mr. Smith is being twice put in jeopardy for 
3 the same offense. The statutes — I'm sorry, the 
4 cases are very, very specific in addressing that 
5 issue and saying, the legislature has simply 
6 determined that we are going to punish people more 
7 severely when they fall into this particular 
8 class, which the defendant clearly does. The jury 
9 clearly returned the verdict indicating he had used a 
10 firearm. 
11 The fact of the matter is is that the 
12 legislature gives Your Honor some additional 
13 direction in that they want those sentences 
14 enhancements to be consecutive, and not concurrent, 
15 and gives you discretion in determining whether or 
16 not that would be for one year or for an additional 
17 zero to five. 
18 Based upon all those reasons, Your Honor, as 
19 set out in our memorandum, it is our position that 
2 0 the change does not change anything that has 
21 previously been argued in both the Utah Supreme Court 
22 and the Utah Court of Appeals, nor is there anything 
23 lined out in the defense's brief that would indicate 
24 that that is the case. 
25 It is our position, therefore, obviously, that 
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1 Your Honor should, and the law allows that, in fact, 
2 there be a penalty enhancement for his use of the 
3 firearm. 
4 On the issue, specifically, on what this 
5 defendant's sentence should be, it is the State's 
6 position that his Aggravated Robbery conviction 
7 should, in fact, be a consecutive sentence. And the 
8 primary reason for that, Your Honor, is that this 
9 defendant has shown an incredible pattern of conduct 
10 over a period of time. Mr. Gravis says he only has 
11 misdemeanors. If you look at what those misdemeanors 
12 are, they are aggravated assaults that were amended 
13 down; they were carrying concealed weapons. They 
14 were situations like that where the defendant is 
15 showing you a propensity for violence. 
16 Beyond that, when he is out there and 
17 committing the agg robbery — that the jury clearly 
18 found that he did — he chose to interject himself 
19 into a public restaurant with an assault weapon in 
20 his hands and start ordering and threatening people 
21 in such a situation, or in such a manner, that those 
22 type of crimes mandate the very toughest sentence 
2 3 that the courts can impose. 
24 Beyond that, there's an additional factor that 
25 I think the Court needs to be aware of. Calling your 
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1 attention back to the testimony of Special Agent Bob 
2 Evans — Mr. Gravis has a copy of this and it wasn't 
3 something that was testified to because for purposes 
4 of the determination of guilt or innocence, it is not 
5 something that was relevant, 
6 During the course of this defendant talking to 
7 Mr. Evans and being tape-recorded about how he had 
8 committed this crime, he also starts talking about 
9 other individuals that he is upset at, specifically, 
10 an individual who shot him, and how when that 
11 individual gets out of jail or out of prison, how he 
12 is, in fact, going to get him. How is he, in fact, 
13 taking this fact that he has been shot very personal 
14 and that he is going to return the favor, if you 
15 will, and impose upon him the same thing that this 
16 defendant indicates that he did to the defendant. 
17 The bottom line is, Your Honor, is that this 
18 is an individual who I'm not sure ever is going to be 
19 in a position where — where the State believes that 
20 he's ever going to be in a position where he should 
21 ever be outside of the walls of the Utah State 
22 Prison. He has gang affiliations, he shows a 
23 propensity for violence. He commits the most serious 
24 crimes you can commit, and his history indicates that 
25 he's done it in the past. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
24 
1 For all of those reasons, it would be our 
2 position that his five to life should run consecutive 
3 to everything else that he is doing, and that it will 
4 be Your Honor's determination of whether or not the 
5 additional penalty would be for one year or for a 
6 zero to five. 
7 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I 
8 approach the bench and borrow one of the your Codes? 
9 THE COURT: Sure. 
10 (Off-the-record discussion.) 
11 MR. GRAVIS: First off, in response 
12 to Mr. Heward, Mr. — he incorrectly stated Mr. 
13 Smith's prior record. It shows no aggravated 
14 assaults being reduced to class A misdemeanors. He's 
15 never been charged with an aggravated assault and had 
16 it reduced. He's never been charged with aggravated 
17 assault. 
18 He was charged with two previous felonies, but 
19 neither one of them were aggravated assaults. They 
20 were both dismissed. 
21 So — and let me find the section. 
22 (Mr. Gravis looks at Utah Code.) 
23 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, Mr. Heward 
24 indicates that the aggravated robbery was amended in 
25 1995 to change the language. It was amended — the 
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statute, as it currently reads, was amended in 1994. 
It says, use of a dangerous weapon. And I can't 
recall — and I don't have the cases here. I was 
looking through them when I cited them. I believe it 
said dangerous weapon back when these other cases 
were decided. I don't think that language has been 
changed. 
But clearly, since 1995, the enhancement 
statute was changed from firearm to use of a 
dangerous weapon, and I submit that it's our position 
that that is a difference, that the robbery statute 
said: use of a dangerous weapon makes it an 
aggravated robbery. I believe that's the case where 
it's always been that way for several years. 
But the use of a firearm -- the changing from 
the use of a firearm to use of a dangerous weapon in 
April of 1995 is a significant change since those 
cases have been decided because the language is the 
same: Uses a dangerous weapon in a robbery, because 
an aggravated robbery -- the enhancement is another 
enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon. Doesn't 
matter whether it's a gun, knife or whatever in the 
new statute, where in the old statute, it's a 
firearm. 
So we submit that it's inappropriate. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, let me ask — just 
2 one concern, Mr. Gravis. Assuming, you know, the 
3 correctness of your position and — for the purpose 
4 of the argument, anyway — in this case it was a 
5 firearm. And are you really in a position where you 
6 can take advantage of more general language? 
7 MR. GRAVIS: I think so, yes, Your 
8 Honor, because it's more general language. They 
9 changed the law. It's not — if they wanted to leave 
10 it a firearm, they could have left it that way. When 
11 they changed it to all dangerous weapons as an 
12 enhancement, then they're all classified together. 
13 It doesn't matter whether it's a firearm or a 
14 baseball bat. They're all enhancements. The use of 
15 any of them brings in the enhancements. The use of 
16 them also makes them a robbery and aggravated 
17 robbery. 
18 I would submit though probably the legislature 
19 didn't consider that. They don't consider a lot of 
2 0 things when they pass — change statutes. And they 
21 may want to change it back, but as it states right 
22 now, I'd submit that the law cannot — you cannot 
23 impose the dangerous weapon enhancement when you've 
24 already aggravated it from a second degree to a first 
25 degree because of the use of a dangerous weapon. 
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MR. HEWARD: What that ignores, Your 
Honor, is that when the statutes were challenged in 
the three cases, the language on the penalty 
enhancement said "firearm," and the language in the 
robbery statute said "firearm." Now the language in 
the robbery statute says "dangerous weapon," and the 
language in the penalty enhancement says "dangerous 
weapon." 
THE COURT: I see your point. Oh, 
okay. 
MR. HEWARD: So there is no 
difference. They changed -- there's changes in both 
of the applicable statute. 
In regards to Mr. Gravis7 saying I misstated 
it, I do apologize. I said "aggravated assault." 
The defendant wasn't charged with aggravated assault. 
He was charged with attempted homicide. I apologize 
for that. That was in 8-20 of 1993, and it appears 
by guilty plea, he was convicted of threatening with 
a weapon, a Misdemeanor, Class A, but he was charged 
with attempted homicide. 
Also, specifically, Your Honor — 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I'm going 
to object. Mr. Heward is reading things that are not 
included in the presentence report. If he's 
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1 interjecting something that I haven't seen, I would 
2 like a chance to look at it. 
3 MR. HEWARD: I am reading off of the 
4 OR sheet and the attached Utah Criminal History 
5 Record, which Mr. Gravis had a copy of because it was 
6 provided in anticipation of trial. It was something 
7 that was provided to him as far as discovery goes. 
8 MR. GRAVIS: I would have had that, 
9 yes, I agree. I was going off the presentence 
10 report. 
11 MR. HEWARD: As to the other things 
12 that I cited to, in June of '93 there was another 
13 concealed weapon offense that was amended to a 
14 threatening with a weapon, and there was an 
15 additional — there was a riot arrest in 1994 that 
16 there was — does not show a judicial outcome on. 
17 Then there was interfering with arrest, 
18 possession of a deadly weapon, felony, again in 1994, 
19 where the charge appears to have been dismissed, at 
20 least on the possession charge. It doesn't show — 
21 there may have been a conviction. I can't tell. 
22 There was. There was a conviction of carrying a 
23 concealed weapon in 1994. 
24 And then there was the obstruction of police, 
25 Misdemeanor B, that the defendant was also convicted 
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1 of in 1994; and then a couple of other arrests in '95 
2 that it does not show the judicial outcome on. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. HEWARD: I misspoke. It was 
5 attempted homicide, not aggravated assault. 
6 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. 
7 Gravis? You should have the last word. 
8 MR. GRAVIS: Well, Your Honor, I 
9 would state that I don't believe that the statute 
10 was changed — the language. It certainly wasn't 
11 changed in 1995, as Mr. Heward has indicated, to the 
12 use of a dangerous weapon. And I believe the 
13 language at the time of these other cases was the 
14 same as it is now; therefore, there is a difference. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. If I understand 
16 correctly the present provision, the Court has the 
17 option of — well, obviously, the five to life, which 
18 is the statutory penalty. And if I proceed with the 
19 firearm enhancement -- the dangerous weapon 
20 enhancement at this point — that I can either impose 
21 a one-year, minimum mandatory, in essence, 
22 consecutive, or a zero to five. 
2 3 MR. HEWARD: Correct. 
24 THE COURT: In the alternative. 
2 5 MR. HEWARD: That's correct. 
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1 MR. GRAVIS: That's correct, Your 
2 Honor. 
3 MR. HEWARD: The statute doesn't 
4 read that clearly, but I believe that's what the 
5 cases have told us. 
6 THE COURT: As a matter of fact, the 
7 Supreme Court in my case told me. 
8 MR. HEWARD: Yes, I think so. 
9 THE COURT: And they made that 
10 sufficiently clear in the other aggravated robbery 
11 situation we have coming back. 
12 MR. HEWARD: Yeah. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, 
14 on the charge of Aggravated Robbery, it's the order 
15 of the Court that you be committed to prison for a 
16 period of not less than five years and may be for as 
17 much as life. The Court is, in addition, going to 
18 impose a consecutive zero to five years as a firearm 
19 enhancement — or deadly weapon enhancement. 
20 The Court believing that I have achieved, 
21 basically, with that what I'd need to achieve, has no 
22 objection with that sentence running concurrently 
23 with the previous zero to five out of Davis County. 
24 In other words, I think it would be kind of stacking 
25 it on to give him a zero to five consecutive on the 
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